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Abstract
Credit and debit cards, rather than actual money, have become the universal payment means. With these cards, it has become
possible to buy expensive items easily without an additional complex authentication procedure being conducted. However, card
transaction features are targeted by criminals seeking to use a lost or stolen card and looking for a chance to replicate it. Accidents,
whether caused by the negligence of users or not, that lead to a transaction being performed by a criminal rather than the authorized
card user should be prevented. Therefore, card companies are providing their clients with a variety of policies and standards to
cover this eventuality. Card companies must therefore be able to distinguish between the rightful user and illegal users according
to these standards in order to minimize damage resulting from unauthorized transactions.
However, there is a limit to applying the same fixed standards to all card users, since the transaction patterns of people differ and
even individuals’ transaction patterns may change frequently due to changes income and consumption preference. Therefore, when
only a specific threshold is applied, it is difficult to distinguish a fraudulent card transaction from a legitimate one.
In this paper, we present methods for learning the individual patterns of a card user’s transaction amount and the region in which
he or she uses the card, for a given period, and for determining whether the specified transaction is allowable in accordance with
these learned user transaction patterns. Then, we classify legitimate transactions and fraudulent transactions by setting thresholds
based on the learned individual patterns.
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1. Introduction
A lot of crime involving card fraud is being perpetrated due
to transaction card cloning or theft. Thus, in order to prevent
fraudulent transactions due the replication of a card at source,
financial authorities in many countries are moving from the
Magnetic Stripe (MS) card to the Integrated Circuit (IC) card.
However in contrast to banks which can easily introduce ATMs
dedicated to IC cards, it is not easy for retail stores to replace
the previous card reader at Point of Sale (POS) terminals with
an IC reader device. Therefore, at present, the card data, which
include the consumer’s credit information and transaction data
are included in both the MS and IC of a card, and as a result,
it seems still difficult to prevent illegal card use resulting from
theft or replication.
Card companies currently have introduced a variety of mea-
sures to prevent damage being caused to the consumer by an
unauthorized card transaction, such as sending an SMS about
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the transaction and a copy of the transaction by E-mail, sus-
pending the use of the credit card, and so on. However, these
methods are dependent on consumer’s attention. When they
do not pay attention to the received billing messages and are
therefore not aware of a fraudulent transaction perpetrated us-
ing their card, it is difficult to detect fraud cases early and take
appropriate action.
The card companies may take voluntary action to prevent
unauthorized payments by determining in what location and the
amount of the transaction for which a card is used. For exam-
ple, if a payment involving a large amount of money is made
in Southeast Asia, and the previous transaction had occurred
on hour previously in Seoul, Republic of Korea, the company
may conduct a verification process through a phone call to the
customer. Because the same card cannot be used almost simul-
taneously in two distant locations, a rational explanation is that
a duplicate of the card was used.
However, there is a limit to the number of fraudulent trans-
actions that can be detected by simply using a fixed threshold
value for the geographic distance between transactions, and the
location or amount of payment, because the consumption lev-
els of people differ, and a cloned or lost card can be used in a
location close to the legitimate owner’s normal use area.
In this paper, we therefore propose methods for detecting an
illegal card transaction using large scale data analysis. The cus-
tomers’ unique billing pattern is used in the process. In the next
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section, we provide related studies and discuss the differences
between these and our study. In section 3, we provide the back-
ground of statistical methods and data mining approaches. In
section 4, we discuss the model for our experiment on the de-
tection of fraudulent transactions, which is based on transaction
patterns. In section 5, we present our experimental results, and
we discuss the reasons for the results in section 6. Finally, we
present our conclusions in section 7.
2. Material and methods
Data mining is finding patterns in data that are statistically
reliable, previously unknown, and can be analyzed to provide
useful insights (?). Fraud detection is a main research area in
the field of data mining. The goal of using the data mining ap-
proach in the detection of card fraud is to determine whether
the card used in a transaction has been used by the legitimate
card user. Here, a card is a means of payment used for transac-
tions, such as a credit, debit, or purchase card, and the user is
the authorized owner of the card. The data used for data mining
constitutes a user’s transaction records.
Statistical fraud detection methods have been classified into
two broad categories: “supervised” and “unsupervised” (??).
In supervised methods, estimated statistical models are used
to discriminate between fraudulent and legitimate purchase be-
haviors by classifying new observations into the appropriate
class: fraudulent or legitimate transaction (??). This method
requires samples from both classes, fraudulent and legitimate
observations, as the models are trained based on examples of
observations in both classes (?). The models created by the
method are assessed by measuring their accuracy in correctly
classifying new observations as fraudulent or non-fraudulent
(?). Since 2001, most fraud detection studies using supervised
algorithms have focused on the misclassification rate (i.e., the
false positive and false negative error rate) (?).
Related works in which supervised methods are used for clas-
sifying credit card transactions into legitimate and fraudulent
transactions have been published: ? employed a transaction
aggregation strategy to create variables for the estimation of a
logistic regression model, and ? used a binary support vector
system based on the support vectors in support vector machines
and a genetic algorithm to solve credit card fraud problems that
had not been well identified (?).
Unsupervised methods attempt to detect unusual observa-
tions, such as customers, transactions, or accounts whose be-
havior may be different from the norm (?), which can be identi-
fied by clustering based on normal legitimate behavior patterns.
As unsupervised methods do not require samples of fraudulent
and legitimate transactions, there may be cases where there is
no prior knowledge of classes of observations (?).
In earlier studies, unsupervised methods were also used for
clustering to detect credit card fraud. ? built a Hidden Markov
Model for the sequence of operations in credit card transac-
tion processing. ? focused on real-time fraud detection and
presented a new model. ? created a model of typical card-
holder behavior and analyzed deviations in transactions in order
to identify suspicious ones. The studies of ? and ? were based
on a self-organizing map algorithm (?).
A data mining approach for mobility patterns is also used
to predict the location of drivers or mobile phone users. ? pre-
sented a Hidden Markov Model-based approach to provide real-
time predictions of a driver’s destination and route. ? focused
on the regions of interest and the typical travel time of moving
objects from region to region. They introduced a novel form of
spatio-temporal pattern, which formalizes the idea of aggregate
movement behavior which they discuss. ? proposed a context
model, based on classification using a certain moving profile
and history of movements. They evaluated their schemes with
Bayesian algorithms, decision-tree, and rule induction.
Using supervised methods to detect fraudulent card transac-
tion involves many constraints. Because academicians have dif-
ficulty acquiring credit card transaction datasets, it is not easy to
exchange ideas and possible innovations related to credit card
fraud detection because of the dearth of published literature in
this subject (???).
In this paper, we therefore detect fraudulent transaction based
on the pattern of the amount of a customer’s payment using the
purchase card data that are publicly available. The pattern is an-
alyzed through Gaussian Processes (GPs) and the Autoregres-
sive (AR) model, which have not previously been well docu-
mented in the area of fraud detection. Further, to characterize
the pattern of a customer’s payment region, we collect the loca-
tion of the customer and track the mobility confidence. Then,
we find abnormal values by extracting the association rules of
the payment region of a card user by applying an association
rule algorithm (?), which has previously been used to predict
the movement of mobile phone users.
3. Theory and calculation
3.1. Autoregressive model
Given a dataset of N observations {yi}Ni=1, where yi ∈ R,
AR(p) is the autoregressive model that expresses the i-th data
with p prior data
{
y j
}i−p
j=i−1. The equation of AR(p) is defined as
yi = a0 +
p∑
j=1
a jyi− j + ǫi
where
{
a j
}p
j=1 are parameters of the model, a0 is a constant, and
ǫi is white noise.
We can express the terms from y1 to yN by

y1
y2
y3
...
yN

=

1 0 0 . . . 0
1 y1 0 . . . 0
1 y2 y1 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
...
1 yN−1 yN−2 . . . yN−p


a0
a1
a2
...
ap

+ ǫ. (1)
Here, yi, where 1 ≤ i ≤ N, are training data and used to
estimate a target yN+1. In order to impose a restriction such
that not all previous data can be used to infer the target data, it
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is also possible to utilize only the data close to the target data
by using a fixed small window size. Let the left hand term of
equation (1) be Y, the N × (p+ 1) matrix of the right term be X,
and the matrix that contains unknown values a0, a1, · · · , an, be
A. Then, the equation can be rewritten as a simple linear form
given by
Y = XA + ǫ. (2)
This represents that equation (2) is a simple linear model with
input data X and parameters A. The observed data Y have a
noise term ǫ, which is assumed to be independent and identi-
cally distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian distribution
ǫ ∼ N(0, τ−1I),
where N(a, b) denotes a Gaussian distribution with mean a and
variance b, and τ is a precision value that is an inverse of the
variance.
This noise assumption, together with the model, directly
gives rise to the likelihood (i.e., the probability density of the
observations given the parameters), which is factored over the
cases in the training set (because of the independence assump-
tion) to give (?, chap. 2)
P(Y |X, A) =
N∏
i=1
p(yi|xi, A)
=
N∏
i=1
1
(2πτ−1)1/2 exp
{
−
(yi − xiA)2
2τ−1
}
=
1
(2πτ−1)N/2 exp
{
−
1
2τ−1
|Y − XA|2
}
= N(XA, τ−1I). (3)
Then, the residual vector is Y − XA. A generalized least
squares method is used to estimate A by minimizing the squared
Mahalanobis length of this residual vector:
ˆA = argA min
{
(Y − XA)Tτ−1I(Y − XA)
}
.
Hence,
ˆA = (XT X)−1XT Y. (4)
The variance of an error term ǫ, τ−1, is obtained by the max-
imum likelihood
τˆ−1 = argτ−1 max P(Y | ˆA, τ−1).
Substituting P(Y | ˆA, τ−1) for the form of the Gaussian distribu-
tion, we obtain the log likelihood function in the form (?, chap.
1)
L = ln P(Y | ˆA, τ−1)
= −
τ
2
(Y − X ˆA)T (Y − X ˆA) + N
2
ln τ
2π
. (5)
Now, we can obtain the estimated precision by inducing the
differential equation of equation (5) equal to 0 as
τ−1 =
1
N
(Y − X ˆA)T (Y − X ˆA). (6)
Now, based on the probability distribution of equation (3),
the target data yN+1 can be predicted by expectation ˆY = X ˆA
with a 95% confidence level with the range:
ˆY − 2τ−1 ≤ yN+1 ≤ ˆY + 2τ−1.
3.2. Gaussian Processes
Gaussian Processes (GPs) are the extension of multivariate
Gaussians to infinite-sized collections of real-valued variables
and distributions over random functions (?). That is, they pre-
dict the subsequent data by revealing the distribution of the non-
linear function f = { fi}Ni=1, which represents the relationship be-
tween the output data y = {yi}Ni=1 and the input data x = {xi}
N
i=1.
Each observation y ∈ R from its corresponding input data x
is given by
y = f (x) + ǫ
through the Gaussian noise model with variance σ2n. The func-
tion f (x) can be expressed as f ∼ N(m, k) given by

f(x1)
...
f(xN)
 ∼ N


m(x1)
...
m(xN)
 ,

k(x1, x1) · · · k(x1, xN)
...
. . .
...
k(xN , x1) · · · k(xN , xN)

 ,
where m is the mean function and k is the covariance func-
tion (?). Usually, for notational simplicity we take the mean
function to be zero. We now choose the covariance function by
writing
k(x, x′) = σ2f exp
{
−(x − x′)2
2l2
}
+ σ2nδ(x, x′), (7)
where δ(x, x′)is the Kronecher delta function (?). Its parame-
ters θ =
{
l, σ f , σn
}
can be estimated through Bayes’ theorem.
According to Bayes and ?, when we have little prior knowl-
edge about what θ should be, this corresponds to maximizing
ln p(y|x, θ), given by
ln p(y|x, θ) = −1
2
yT K−1y −
1
2
ln |K| − n
2
ln 2π. (8)
For estimating the parameters, the Nelder-Mead simplex, mul-
tivariate optimization algorithm (?) is one method that can be
used.
However, in this study it is not enough to determine the pa-
rameters using equation (8). Because there is no restriction on
parameter l, it can have any value from a negative value to 108.
In this case, we use maximum a posteriori (MAP) to find pa-
rameter l as
ln p(l|y) = ln p(y|l)p(l)
p(y)
= ln p(y|l) + ln p(l). (9)
We can replace the term ln p(y|l) in equation (9) with equation
(8). In addition, we need to constrain parameter l in order to
interpret testing data yN+1 as an event related to the close train-
ing data. That is, to estimate the 101-st testing data we focus
more on the 100-th training data than on the 50-th. We thus
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assume that the parameter l follows a non-negative distribution
l ∼ Γ(2, 2), where it is the gamma distribution with a shape
parameter 2 and a scale parameter 2. It is given by
ln p(θ|y) = −1
2
yT K−1y −
1
2
ln |K| − n
2
ln 2π + ln p(l). (10)
Hence, we can obtain restricted parameter l, as well as σ f and
σn, by calculating the arguments that maximize equation (10).
For simplicity, we assumed the prior distribution of σ f and σn
follow uniform distribution, which is an improper distribution.
Now, given N observations of y, in order to predict not the
actual f∗ but y∗, we prepare three matrices.
K =

k(x1, x1) k(x1, x2) · · · k(x1, xN)
k(x2, x1) k(x2, x2) · · · k(x2, xN)
...
...
. . .
...
k(xN , x1) k(xN , x2) · · · k(xN , xN)

(11)
K∗ =
[
k(x∗, x1) k(x∗, x2) · · · k(x∗, xN)
]
(12)
K∗∗ = k(x∗, x∗). (13)
Then, y∗ can be predicted based on N observations of y as a
sample from a multivariate Gaussian distribution:
[
y
y∗
]
∼ N
(
0,
[
K KT∗
K∗ K∗∗
])
Given the data, a certain prediction for y∗ can be obtained by
conditional Gaussian distributions as
y∗|y ∼ N(K∗K−1y, K∗∗ − K∗K−1KT∗ ).
That is, the best estimate for y∗ follows the distribution that
has the expectation of y∗, y∗ = K∗K−1y, and the uncertainty,
var(y∗) = K∗∗ − K∗K−1KT∗ . Therefore, y∗is decided with the
range:
y∗ − 2
√
var(y∗) ≤ y∗ ≤ y∗ + 2
√
var(y∗),
giving a 95% confidence level.
3.3. Extreme-value theory
Extreme-value theory is a branch of statistics that concerns
the distributions of data of unusually low or high value (?). It
forms representations for the tails of distributions, in this article
especially the right-hand tail.
Assume a set Zm = {z1, z2, · · · , zm} with m i.i.d. random
variables drawn from the one-sided standard Gaussian (i.e.,
D = |N(0, 1)| ) and define z = max(Zm), which means the
largest element observed in m samples of Zm. Then, the ex-
treme value probability (EVP) of z is its probability of being
the largest value in the set and is obtained in the form of the
Gumbel distribution as (??)
PEV (z|m) = exp
{
− exp
(
−
z − µm
σm
)}
, (14)
where the location parameter is
µm = (2 ln m)1/2 − ln(ln m) + ln 2π2(2 ln m)1/2 , (15)
and the scale parameter is
σm = (2 ln m)−1/2. (16)
Since the parameters µm and σm depend on the number of
data, m, m should be specified first in order to evaluate an EVP.
However, because we are not directly interested in m, we obtain
the EVP at time t by marginalizing out the run length lt (?):
PEV (t) =
t∑
m=1
PEV (t|lt = m)P(lt = m). (17)
The run length lt means the time since the last outlier (?), and
its probability (?) is
P(lt = m) =

PEV (t − 1) if m = 1
(1 − PEV (t − 1)) P(lt−1 = m − 1) if m ≥ 2,
where P(lt = 1) = 1. Then, the EVP can be used as a novelty
measure and an outlier can be detected in the case of P(y) >
θEV , where θEV is a threshold with 0 ≤ θEV ≤ 1 (?).
3.4. Association rule
Association rule analysis is a data mining technique used to
find which events are likely to co-occur. In this study, it is used
to extract the region where transactions occur frequently and
the pattern of the movement path, by indicating the transaction
locations as a sequence. For notational convenience,
〈
a(i), b( j)
〉
defines the path sequence of a customer who made payments
with a card i times in region a to j times in region b. For in-
stance, a path sequence
〈
1, 2(2), 3
〉
= 〈1, 2, 2, 3〉 represents the
transition of a customer’s location, such as, 1 → 2 → 2 → 3.
Table 1 is an example that shows the route where the transac-
tions of a certain customer occurred during a month.
Week(s) ago Actual transaction path sequence
4
〈
7, 1(1), 2
〉
3
〈
6(2), 9, 4(3), 10, 1(2)
〉
2
〈
1(3), 6(2), 1, 12, 3
〉
1 〈8, 11〉
Table 1: An example of four sequences of an actual transaction path
By padding the end of each row of Table 1 with 0’s so that
the rows have the same number of columns, we obtain the 4× 9
matrix of the collected transaction path, U, as
U =

7 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0
6 6 9 4 4 4 10 1 1
1 1 1 6 6 1 12 3 0
8 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 . (18)
We can now infer which regions (i.e., numbers) are likely
to follow each other and which regions (i.e., numbers) are as-
sociated with others based on each row of U. Let R(U) be a
collection of row spaces {Ui}4i=1 of matrix U. By applying the
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association rule to the row spaces, R(U), movement patterns are
mined using the support value by discovering the correlation
between the regions where a card user made payments.
From Table 1, the supports of the length-1 pattern, P1, are
determined by the number of row spaces that contain the pat-
tern’s element. The support value of 〈a〉, an element of P1, is
calculated by
S 〈a〉 = |{R(U)| 〈a〉 ⊂ R(U)}| . (19)
The supports of the length-n pattern, Pn, are obtained from
the sum of the number of row spaces that contain the length-n
sequences and an incident support, S INC :
S 〈a1,··· ,an〉 = |{R(U)| 〈a1, · · · , an〉 ⊂ R(U)}| + S INC . (20)
The incident support is a value that reflects the region where the
customer’s transactions diverged from the pattern of arriving at
an along the original path (i.e., a2, · · · , an−1) from a1, and is
given by
S INC =

1
1+t , in case of 〈a1, b1, · · · , bt, an〉
0 , otherwise.
(21)
That is, the incident support plays the role of improving the sup-
ports by correcting the result value, even when a customer goes
indirectly to the destination moving along a slightly different
path from that which was mined. For instance, the support value
for a pattern 〈6, 1〉 based on U is S 〈6,1〉 = 1+ 11+5 = 1.1667, since
for U2, the second row space of U,
〈
6, ˙9, ˙4, ˙4, ˙4, ˙10, 1
〉
⊂ U2 and
for U3, the third row space of U, 〈6, 1〉 ⊂ U3.
P1 Support P2 Support P2 Support
〈1〉 3 〈1, 1〉 3 〈6, 6〉 2
〈2〉 1 〈1, 2〉 1 〈6, 9〉 1
〈3〉 1 〈1, 3〉 0.5 〈6, 10〉 0.2
〈4〉 1 〈1, 6〉 1 〈6, 12〉 0.5
〈6〉 2 〈1, 12〉 1 〈7, 1〉 1
〈7〉 1 〈4, 1〉 0.5 〈7, 2〉 0.33
〈8〉 1 〈4, 4〉 1 〈8, 11〉 1
〈9〉 1 〈4, 10〉 1 〈9, 1〉 0.2
〈10〉 1 〈6, 1〉 1.17 〈9, 4〉 1
〈11〉 1 〈6, 3〉 0.33 〈9, 10〉 0.25
〈12〉 1 〈6, 4〉 0.5 〈10, 1〉 1
〈12, 3〉 1
Table 2: The patterns of length-1 and -2, and supports
In Table 2, the support values of length-1 patterns P1 and
length-2 patterns P2 are given. The supports of P3, P3, · · · , PN
can be obtained likewise.
Now, if a card payment in a particular region has occurred,
it is possible to calculate the confidence by analyzing the as-
sociation between the movement path of the current consumer
and the patterns of the locations of payments that were made
in the past. For an association rule of transaction region R :
〈a1, a2, · · · , ai−1〉 → 〈ai, ai+1, · · · , an〉, the confidence is given
by
Con f (R) = S 〈a1,a2,··· ,an〉
S 〈a1,a2,··· ,ai−1〉
× 100. (22)
For example, suppose that we have recent transaction data
where the region is 〈6, 4, 1〉 and the card owner is currently in
location number 1. Then, there are three possible association
rules:
R1 : 〈6〉 → 〈4, 1〉
R2 : 〈6, 4〉 → 〈1〉
R3 : 〈4〉 → 〈1〉 .
The confidence values of each rule are Con f (R1) = 10,
Con f (R2) = 40, and Con f (R3) = 50, and the maximum value
of these results, Con f (R3) = 50, is kept as the confidence score
of the transaction path 〈6, 4, 1〉.
3.5. Adjacency matrix
An adjacency matrix is a means of representing which ver-
tices (or nodes) of a graph are adjacent to which other vertices
(?). We set the transaction region, ai (0 ≤ i ≤ N), as the vertices
of a graph and put edges on a graph when a customer moves
from ai to a j (i.e., ai → a j). This graph is called a directed
graph. Furthermore, it has cycles (i.e., ai → ai) because it is
possible to make more than one payment in the same area. By
giving a weight, that is, the conditional probability of the loca-
tion a j given ai, on the edges of a graph, we can obtain an N×N
square adjacency matrix. Fig. 1 shows an example of a directed
graph and the conditional probability of Table 1 based on the
adjacency matrix.
For instance, given the current transaction data in the re-
gion 〈6, 4, 1〉, the confidence score (or conditional probability)
is P(a = 1|a = 4) = 0, from Fig. 1.
−10 −5 0 5 10
−10
−5
0
5
10
0.625
0.125
0.125
0.125
1
1
0.66667
0.33333
0.25
0.5
0.25
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Figure 1: Directed graph with conditional probability. Each node is represented
by a circle, which contains the region number, and edges are represented by
arrows. An arrow from one region to another means that there was a history of
movement between these regions with specific conditional probability.
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4. Model and algorithm
We compare the accuracy of the methods of AR model (?)
and GPs (?) for detecting large payments according to the trans-
action amount pattern, and also compare the accuracy of the
methods of association rule analysis (?) and adjacency matrix
(?) for detecting abnormal movement according to the transac-
tion region pattern.
The data used for the experiments in this study were
classified into two broad categories: legitimate transactions
and fraudulent transactions. In our experiments, as legiti-
mate transaction data, we used “Purchase Card Transactions”.
We used the data in the “Transaction amount” and “Vendor
State/Province” columns. The data are publicly available (Fig.
2, https://opendata.socrata.com/).
Figure 2: OpenData used for the experiment
Fraudulent transaction data were extracted from the statisti-
cal results of ? using a dataset of real-world credit card trans-
actions. The dataset contains 2,420 fraudulent transactions; a
good summary of the dataset is given in ?, Table 4. Given the
fraudulent dataset, the transaction amount of fraudulent event is
generated by non-negative distribution with the mean and stan-
dard deviation of the attribution, that is, the average amount
spent per transaction over a month on all transactions up to this
transaction. The transaction region of a fraudulent event is gen-
erated with the legitimate transaction location by random per-
mutation based on the assumption that the transaction region
pattern of perpetrators is distinguishable from that of a legiti-
mate normal user of a card.
Figure 3: Datasets used in experiments for detecting fraudulent transactions.
Based on one legitimate transaction sequence, which consists of 100 transac-
tions, we pad two kinds of data, subsequent legitimate transaction A and arbi-
trary fraudulent transaction B, which consists of 5 transactions. We call them
dataset L and F respectively. This figure also shows the process of constituting
(i + 1)-th dataset from i-th dataset. Each dataset L preserves a certain transac-
tion patterns by using a series of continuous legitimate transactions. In contrast,
testing data of dataset Fs has no relationship with training data (i.e., legitimate
transaction sequence)
The datasets used our experiments are shown in Fig. 3. We
first train with 100 transactions, which is called a “legitimate
transaction sequence”, and learn the pattern of a legitimate card
user. Then, we test the next transaction data whether it is le-
gitimate or fraudulent. There are two kinds of testing data with
length 5: “subsequent legitimate transaction” data A and “arbi-
trary fraudulent transaction” data B. The legitimate transaction
data A are the subsequent continuous transaction data of the
training data, and the fraudulent transaction data B are inde-
pendent of the previous training data. It should be noted that
the number of the testing data is even smaller than that of the
training data. Because perpetrators attempt to use stolen credit
cards quickly to maximize the amount of the fraudulent pay-
ments, the sooner these transactions are detected, the greater
the loss that can be avoided by stopping transactions made with
the fraudulent credit cards (?).
Now, let the 105 legitimate transaction data be dataset L and
other transaction data inserted into the fraudulent transaction
data be dataset F. We prepared 20 dataset Ls and Fs each to
conduct our experiment for various transaction data. Both of
dataset Ls and Fs include 105 transactions, and (i+1)-th dataset
consists of 100 training data and 5 testing data as:
• (i + 1)-th dataset L = (rear part of legitimate transaction
sequence | 1-th A | · · · | i-th A || (i + 1)-th A)
• (i + 1)-th dataset F = (original legitimate transaction se-
quence || (i + 1)-th B),
where “|” represents a concatenation and “||” represents a divi-
sion between training data and testing data.
The characteristics of them are distinguishable with existence
of transaction patterns. All dataset Ls preserve a certain trans-
action patterns, but Fs do not. While dataset Ls consist of con-
tinuous legitimate transaction sequence, dataset Fs consist of
fraudulent transactions padded to a certain legitimate transac-
tion sequence.
We conduct experiments using two methods to determine
which method is better for detecting outliers that do not fol-
low the pattern of the legitimate consumer and what threshold
value is optimal for classifying the transactions of a legitimate
customer and those of a perpetrator as:
• For the transaction amount, we set a threshold value and
confirm whether the threshold allows a transaction amount
to be identified as legitimate or fraudulent.
• For transactions with amount and region, we give a con-
fidence score for each transaction, that is, the similarity
of the current transaction to previous transaction patterns,
and confirm the distribution of these scores over legitimate
and fraudulent cases. Then, we set a threshold based on the
distribution.
In AR(p) we should first make a decision over the number
of AR terms, p, and the order of differencing, d. Here, p rep-
resents the number of previous transactions used to express a
transaction with a linear combination of previous transactions,
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and d represents the number of differences needed to stationar-
ize a sample of the legitimate transaction sequence.
The root mean square error (RMSE) shows the estimated
white noise standard deviation, and the autocorrelation func-
tion (ACF) plot shows the coefficients of correlation between
data and lags for the sample. It is helpful to decide p and d
by focusing on the lowest standard deviation and the small and
patternless autocorrelations.
(p, d) RMSE
(1, 1) 1.92049
(2, 1) 1.91002
(3, 0) 1.64051
(4, 0) 1.64892
(5, 0) 1.61823
Table 3: The root mean square error (RMSE) for p and d over the sample of
legitimate transaction sequence, where p represents the number of AR terms
and d represents the order of differencing. The optimal value of p and d can be
often founded at which the lowest RMSE.
Figure 4: The bar graph of autocorrelations of AR model with p = 5 and d = 0
for transaction amount of the sample. Two red horizontal lines indicate the
approximate upper and lower confidence bounds. If the autocorrelations are all
small and patternless, then the data does not need a higher order of differencing.
According to Table 3 and Fig. 4, we choose p = 5 and d = 0.
In the AR model and GPs, we calculate the estimated mean
and variance of yN+1, E and V respectively, EVP of yN+1, P
and the confidence score of yN+1, C from the training data, Y =
{yi}Ni=1, and testing data, yN+1 using algorithm 1 and 2.
Autoregressive()
p ← 5 and Y ← ln Y
X ← {1, yi}Ni=1 as X of equation (2)
ˆA ← equation (4) and τ−1 ← equation (6)
E ← X ˆA
V ← τ−1
P ← PEV (yN+1) as equation (17)
C ← 1 − cd f (Normal, yN+1, E,V)
return E, V , P, C
Algorithm 1: Predict and score the confidence of transac-
tion amount using the AR model
In algorithm 1, “cd f (Normal, yN+1, E,V)” represents a cu-
mulative distribution function value of normal distribution with
mean E and variance V at yN+1.
GaussianProcess()
x ← (1 2 · · ·N)T
y ← ln Y
K ← equation (11)
l, σ f , σn ← arg max {ln p(θ|x, y)} as equation (10)
k(x, x′) ← equation (7)
K, K∗, K∗∗ ← equation (11), (12), and (13)
E ← K∗K−1y
V ← K∗∗ − K∗K−1KT∗
P ← PEV (yN+1) as equation (17)
C ← 1 − cd f (Normal, yN+1, E,V)
return E, V , P, C
Algorithm 2: Predict and score the confidence of transac-
tion amount using GPs
In the association rule and adjacency matrix, we calculate
only the confidence score C of the transaction region aN+1 of
the testing data from transaction path {ai}Ni=1 of the training data
using algorithms 3 and 4. In algorithm 3, Ui means the i-th row
of matrix U. In algorithm 4, A(i, j) means an entry value of the
i-th row, j-th column of matrix A.
AssociationRule()
for (i = 1 → N) do
U ← ai with 10 columns as equation (18)
end
foreach subsequence s of 〈aN−1, aN , aN+1〉 do
i ← 1
while Ui , ∅ do
case s ⊂ Ui
S 〈s〉 ← S 〈s〉 + 1
endsw
case for a ∈ s, a ∈ Ui
S 〈s〉 ← S 〈s〉 + 11+t as equation (21)
endsw
i ← i + 1
end
end
C1 ← S 〈aN−1,aN ,aN+1〉/S 〈aN−1〉
C2 ← S 〈aN−1,aN ,aN+1〉/S 〈aN−1 ,aN〉
C3 ← S 〈aN ,aN+1〉/S 〈aN 〉
C ← max {C1,C2,C3}
return C
Algorithm 3: Score the confidence of transaction region us-
ing association rule
5. Results
5.1. Outlier detection for the transaction amount
We first apply the logarithmic functions to datasets L and F
in the experiment, and perform outlier detection for the trans-
action amount using GPs and AR(5) at a confidence level of
95% (i.e., +2 SD), as shown in Fig. 5 and 6. The upper plots
7
AdjacencyMatrix()
A ← N × N zero matrix
for i = 1 → N do
A(ai, ai+1) ← A(ai, ai+1) + 1
end
foreach A(i, j) do
A(i, j) ← A(i, j)/∑Nj=1 A(i, j)
end
C ← A(aN , aN+1)
return C
Algorithm 4: Score the confidence of transaction region us-
ing adjacency matrix
in these figures help us to obtain a comprehensive grasp of the
transaction amount and its mean and upper bound, while the
lower plots focus on the range of testing data, A and B, from
the 101-st to 105-th transaction.
In the case of AR(5), as shown in Fig. 5, all the legitimate
transactions in dataset L are identified as legitimate. However,
in dataset F, the fraudulent transactions are not detected as such
except one transaction, because the upper bound for dataset F
was too high to identify the amount of the fraudulent transac-
tions.
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Figure 5: Outlier detection with AR(5) and +2 SD. The transaction amount
of datasets L and F are represented by the solid black line. The vertical blue
line divides the transactions into the legitimate transaction sequence on the left
side and subsequent legitimate transactions on the right side in (a), or arbitrary
fraudulent transactions on the right side in (b). The mean and 2 standard de-
viation estimated from AR(5) are represented by the red dotted and solid line
respectively.
In the case of GPs, as shown in Fig. 6, GPs also identified
the legitimate transactions in dataset L, and not the fraudulent
transactions in dataset F. It seems that the arbitrary fraudulent
transactions, B, in dataset F do not overwhelm the large amount
of legitimate transaction sequences that sometimes occurred.
When the confidence level threshold is adjusted to 68% (i.e.,
+1 SD), in Figs. 7 and 8, outliers, indicated by magenta square,
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Figure 6: Outlier detection with GPs and +2 SD. The red dotted and solid lines
represent, respectively, the mean and 2 standard deviation estimated from GPs.
The datasets L and F are same as those used in AR(5).
are found more easily than when threshold is 95% (i.e., +2 SD).
However, false-positive errors were incurred because the legit-
imate transactions were detected, as well as the dataset F that
contains fraudulent transactions.
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Figure 7: Outlier detection with AR(5) and +1 SD. Transaction amount and
estimated mean are same as in Fig.5. Only the upper bound is downsized.
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Figure 8: Outlier detection with GPs and +1 SD. Transaction amount and esti-
mated mean are same as in Fig. 6. Only the upper bound is downsized.
Figs. 9 and 10 show the results of outlier detection for L and
F using not the standard deviations but extreme-value probabil-
ity (EVP) with the threshold θEV = 0.6. The red circles in the
upper plots represent EVPs (i.e., PEV ) larger than 0.6, and the
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corresponding testing data are indicated as magenta squares in
the lower plots. In Fig. 9, the distribution of testing data is sup-
posed to be one-sided standard Gaussian having the estimated
mean and standard deviation from the AR(5) model. The distri-
bution of testing data in Fig. 10 is from GPs. In these cases, we
found that EVP gives a more reliable result because not only
did both AR(5) and GPs identify the fraudulent transactions in
dataset F as fraud more accurately than the +1 SD method, but
also identified the legitimate transactions in dataset L as normal
more accurately than the +1 SD method. However, since there
are some data such that PEV > 0.6 in a legitimate transaction
sequence (i.e., on the left side of the vertical blue line in the up-
per plots), we can assume that it still gives rise to false-positive
errors for the large amount transactions that are sometimes gen-
erated by a legitimate consumer.
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Figure 9: Outlier detection with AR(5) and EVP. The upper plots show the
extreme value probability of the transaction amount represented by the solid
red line. Means and standard deviations of each transaction amount are used to
draw EVP and obtained by AR(5). Red circles indicate the points where PEV is
larger than 0.6. The lower transactions corresponding to these points are defined
as outliers. They are indicated by magenta squares in the lower plot. The lower
plots show the transaction amounts and outliers, which are transactions where
PEV is larger than 0.6.
Therefore, we consider the association rule and adjacency
matrix, as well as AR(5) and GPs, which handle the move-
ment pattern of a consumer path, and determine the difference
in the transaction pattern distribution of legitimate and fraud-
ulent transactions. Then, we propose a optimal threshold for
classifying them.
5.2. Confidence on the transaction amount and region
The confidence score for the transaction amount uses the cu-
mulative distribution function (CDF) of Gaussian distribution,
which has mean and standard deviations estimated from AR(5)
or GPs. In the case of Gaussian distribution with 0 mean and 1
variance (i.e., standard normal distribution), if the random vari-
able of a newly occurred transaction amount is close to zero,
(i.e., the average payment), we can understand that it follows
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Figure 10: Outlier detection with GPs and EVP. Means and standard deviations
of each transaction amounts are used to draw EVP and obtained by GPs.
the transaction pattern. On the other hand, if the random vari-
able of a transaction amount is negative in standard normal dis-
tribution, we can ignore that event due to the small transaction
amount, which is not threatening. In another case, when a ran-
dom variable of the amount is positive in the distribution, we
should pay attention to the event, since it represents that a large
amount transaction exceeds the existing pattern has occurred.
In order to express this possible threat as a numerical value, we
define the confidence score for the transaction amount as “1-
CDF”. That is, when the confidence score is higher, a smaller
transaction amount will not cause concern, and when the confi-
dence score is lower, a relatively large transaction amount that
exceeds the pattern of the existing customer’s transactions will
be seen as threatening.
The confidence score for the transaction region is defined as
the result value of the association rule analysis and the condi-
tional probability of the adjacency matrix method.
Now, we can draw two attributions in a two-dimensional
plane by placing the confidence score of the transaction region
on the x coordinate and that of the transaction amount on the y
coordinate. For each of 6 L and F datasets with a total of 30
transaction data (i.e., 30 testing data), we drew a simple dis-
tribution of the confidence score using the transaction amount
and region data. Fig. 11 shows 30 legitimate transaction data
indicated by green points in the upper part and 30 fraudulent
transaction data indicated by magenta points in the lower part.
As shown in Fig. 11, the distribution of the experimental re-
sults for dataset L is spread evenly, but in the case of dataset F
it is confirmed that the confidence scores are gathered at x and y
coordinate values of less than 50. In particular, when the adja-
cency matrix is used for the confidence score for the transaction
region (right side of Fig. 11), the x coordinate value is biased at
less than 50. This means that the association rule that considers
the correlation between a variety of regions is a more appropri-
ate method for processing the movement pattern of users than is
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Figure 11: Comparison of four methods of classifying 30 transaction data. We first used the four methods to observe the distribution of transactions in datasets
L and F. Dataset L, which consists of legitimate transactions, is indicated as green markers and dataset F, which consists of fraudulent transactions, is indicated
as magenta markers. We distinguished the methods by using different marker shapes for each. The markers in the plots of methods with the adjacency matrix are
biased on the left side of the xy-plane.
the adjacency matrix, which deals with only the prior location.
Thus, we constrain the method for finding the confidence
score of the transaction region to the association rule and not
allow the adjacency matrix. With the association rule to obtain
the confidence score of the transaction region, Method 1 uses
GPs, and Method 2 uses AR(5) to obtain that of the transaction
amount. For each of 20 L and F datasets, a total 100 transaction
data (i.e., 100 testing data), the comparison of the two methods
is plotted in Fig. 12. As in Fig. 11 the F data are gathered
at x and y coordinate values of less than 50. However, since
the distribution of the confidence score for the L data, indicated
by circles in the upper part of the figure, has spread in various
places, it is difficult to separate the dataset F from the mixed
dataset with L and F completely.
Therefore, even allowing some errors, we need to find a
threshold θx,y(= x < θ and y < θ) that maximizes the accu-
racy and minimizes the error rate, where the accuracy rate is
defined as the ratio of the number of correctly predicted trans-
action to the total number of transaction data based on a given
threshold. The errors are divided into false-positive and false-
negative. The false-negative error rate is the ratio of the number
of transactions that failed to identify a fraudulent transaction to
the number of F data, and the false-positive error rate is the ra-
tio of the number of transactions that raised a false alarm for a
legitimate transaction to the number of L data.
For example, based on a threshold θx,y = 30, the accuracy
at θx,y = 30 is the sum of the number of markers in dataset L
where x ≥ 30 or y ≥ 30 and the number of markers in dataset
F where x < 30 and y < 30. The false-positive error is the
number of markers in dataset L where x < 30 and y < 30, and
the false-negative error is the number of markers in dataset F
where x ≥ 30 or y ≥ 30.
As a result, θx,y = 40 for Method 1 and θx,y = 50 for Method
2 is the optimal threshold that maximizes the accuracy and min-
imizes the error rate, as shown in detail in Table 4.
Method 1 Method 2
x-axis: Association rule x-axis: Association rule
y-axis: GPs y-axis: AR(5)
Dataset
L
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Dataset
F
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Figure 12: Comparison of two methods for classifying 100 transaction data.
We chose the two better methods to observe the distribution of transactions in
datasets L and F from Fig. 11. The legitimate transactions are evenly spread
in various location while the fraudulent transactions are gathered around the
origin of the coordinates.
6. Discussion
Until now, we gave the confidence scores to a customer’s
transaction amount and region according to the previous trans-
action patterns, and examined the characteristics of the distri-
bution of the values by plotting them in a coordinate plane. As
a result, it was not easy to discriminate completely the data as
legitimate or fraudulent, but by setting the appropriate thresh-
old we can obtain the optimal solution. In spite of these con-
tributions, a discussion about the false-positive errors and false-
negative errors that occurred in this experiment is required. The
reasons for the errors and countermeasures that can be consid-
ered are as follows:
1. The fraudulent transaction amount induced from Table 4
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θx,y = 10 θx,y = 20 θx,y = 30 θx,y = 40 θx,y = 50
Method 1 Accuracy 115(.58) 129(.65) 144(.72) 160(.80) 159(.80)
Method 2 115(.58) 135(.68) 146(.73) 161(.81) 153(.77)
Method 1 False-positive 3 10 14 20 23
False-negative 82 61 42 20 18
Method 2 False-positive 4 7 14 19 29
False-negative 81 58 40 20 18
Table 4: The accuracy and error rate of each method. Method 1 is a combination method of association rule and GPs (i.e., rectangular markers in Figs. 11 and 12).
Method 2 is a combination method of association rule and AR(5) (i.e., circle markers in Figs. 11 and 12). We determined the optimal thresholds with the highest
accuracy and the lowest error rates, indicated in bold type.
of ? was not very significantly higher than the legitimate
transaction amount. Some samples of fraudulent transac-
tion data contain a normal transaction amount that is not
larger than the legitimate transaction amount.
However, this may not be a problem in real-life transac-
tions because perpetrators attempt to use stolen cards or
duplicate cards quickly to maximize the amount of fraudu-
lent transactions so that they can complete before the fraud
comes to light.
2. Immediately after a legitimate transaction involving the
payment of a large amount of money occurs, the estimated
amount of the next transaction is increased in accordance
the amount of the previous transaction. Therefore, a fraud-
ulent transaction involving a relatively small amount is not
identified, and hence, a false-negative error occurs.
This issue can be resolved by reducing the length of the
testing data, the number of transactions processed to iden-
tify the fraud. We used 20 B datasets as testing data in
dataset F. Each the fraudulent set had five transactions
(i.e., 5-length). In our experiment using dataset F, confi-
dence scores of the first and second data of the fraudulent
B sets were generally lower than those of the third, fourth,
and fifth data.
Fig. 13 shows the confidence scores of 20 arbitrary fraud-
ulent transaction data of the B datasets obtained by GPs.
They are plotted in ascending order. The confidence scores
of the first B data are represented by a yellow line, which
is lower than 10. Confidence scores of the second data in
the B dataset are represented by an orange line, which is
almost lower than 10. This means that if we constrained
the number of testing data as 2, there would be less false-
negative errors for the fraudulent transactions in GPs using
a threshold θx,y = 10.
3. Conversely, after a legitimate transaction involving the
payment of a small amount of money occurs, the estimated
amount of the next transaction is decreased in accordance
the amount of the previous transaction. Therefore, a legiti-
mate transaction involving a relatively large amount raises
a false-alarm, and hence, gives rise to a false-positive error.
This issue can also be resolved by adding a certain transac-
tion amount that may have occurred in a fraudulent trans-
action to the threshold of confidence scores.
4. Because the confidence score is 0 for the first visit loca-
tion, many data are gathered on the y-axis, whether the
Figure 13: Confidence scores of fraudulent transaction set B in the order of
testing data obtained by GPs. An arbitrary fraudulent transaction set B has
5 transactions. For each of 20 fraudulent B testing datasets, the confidence
scores of the first data in the B datasets are represented by orange dots and lines
in ascending order. The second to fifth data are also represented by different
colors. This figure shows that the first and second transactions of the B datasets
almost never exceeded a confidence score of 10. This demonstrates that the
shorter the length of the testing data used, the lower is the false-negative error
rate in not only GPs but also AR(5).
transaction is legitimate or fraudulent.
For consumers whose lifestyle is fixed and regular, it
seems that the cases where the data are clustered on the
y-axis are usually fewer. In addition, in this experiment
the region of a fraudulent transaction is obtained randomly
from the region of a legitimate transaction. However, since
in real life the region of a fraudulent transaction is com-
pletely independent of the region of a legitimate transac-
tion, there may be more fraudulent transaction data near
the y-axis.
7. Conclusion
This paper proposed methods that use the transaction patterns
of a consumer to detect fraudulent card use.
For many reasons, such as changes in income, lifestyle, and
place of abode, the consumption patterns of credit card users
also change frequently. Therefore, it is difficult to detect a
fraudulent card transaction when only certain fixed conditions
have been set. In this paper, we present a method for learning
automatically the consumption pattern of a customer, and de-
tecting the fraudulent use of a card that has been duplicated or
stolen based on the pattern.
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This study also addressed 2-dimensional methods by not only
dealing with the amount of transactions but also highlighting
the patterns in the region in which a transaction occurs.
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